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ALAS IN WONDERLAND: THE IMPACT OF PENN 
CENTRAL V NEW YORK UPON HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION LAW AND POLICY 
Thane DeNimmo Scott* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As urban America enters the 1980's, the attention being given to 
historic preservation by city planners and environmentalists is cre-
ating an increasing amount of controversy. t Historic preservation 
litigation, through which competing economic and aesthetic inter-
ests within the community seek to affect urban life, is becoming a 
common phenomenon. Frequently, the urban landmark threatened 
with destruction becomes the focal point of divisive and exclusive 
interests which resort to legal battles to resolve the conflict. 2 When 
faced with such a conflict, traditional legal principles and philoso-
phies3 are often inadequate and are unable to provide uniform 
guidelines to resolve this problem. 
The primary goal of the adjudicative and legislative processes is 
to objectify the priorities to be given parties in the conflict of private 
rights versus collective rights.4 By examining these often conflicting 
priorities one can see the dilemma perplexing judges and other pol-
icy makers. What are the rights and priorities to be afforded land-
owners, developers, environmental groups, institutional lenders, 
·Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REviEW. 
I See generally Note, Urban Landmarks: Preserving Our Cities' Aesthetic and Cultural 
Resources, 39 ALB. L. REv. 521 (1975). 
2 See Gerstell, Needed: A Landmark Decision, 8 URB. LAw. 213 (1976). 
3 Within this article the phrase "traditional legal principles and philosophies" is used to 
refer primarily to the absolute right of the owner of a fee simple interest to use and dispose 
of his land with minimal interference by the community. See Cross, The Diminishing Fee, 
20 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 517 (1955). See also 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.1 (A.J. 
Casner ed. 1952); 2 R. POWELL, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, ch. 13 n 175·9, 190. 
• E.g., Ragsdale & Sher, The Court's Role in the Evolution of Power Over Land, 7 URB. 
LAW. 60 (1975). 
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regulatory agencies and other interested parties once a historic pres-
ervation policy is adopted? In the context of historic preservation 
the question is not the ability of the government to regulate land 
use and, as a consequence, to diminish the land's value, for that 
power is well-established. Rather "[t]he fundamental question 
that should be faced, and which deserves a rationally developed 
legislative response, is not whether these costs [e.g. inability to use 
land to obtain the greatest return] will be paid; it is who will pay 
them, in accordance with what substantive and procedural criteria, 
and through which institutional arrangements."5 
This article will deal with the preceding question by first examin-
ing the development of eminent domain and police power regulation 
of land use, examining the New York City Landmark Preservation 
Law as representative of historic preservation legislation. An exami-
nation of the litigation under this statute, culminating in the Su-
preme Court decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. u. City 
of New York,8 will show that historic preservation has generally 
been upheld as a legitimate exercise of police power in furtherance 
of the general welfare. Finally, an analysis of the impact of the 
Penn Central decision will illustrate that, while historic preserva-
tion is a sound economic and aesthetic policy, the means utilized 
to execute this policy by both the courts and legislatures are often 
short sighted and occasionally counterproductive. 
II. THE INADEQUACY OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF LAND 
"OWNERSHIP" IN A HISTORIC PRESERVATION CONTEXT 
When land was plentiful and people were few, the question of 
what rights properly belonged to a landowner had a very simple 
answer: a landowner could do as he pleased, since there was no real 
possibility that his actions could harm others.7 From the twelfth to 
the eighteenth centuries, the period during which our traditional 
concepts of ownership rights were formulated, landowners were al-
most entirely free from regulation by the sovereign. During this 
period land functioned as security for the propertied classes, provid-
ing stable value while simultaneously producing income-much like 
the contemporary function of stocks and bonds. However, concur-
rent with the rise of industrialization and urbanization in the nine-
• Van Alstyne, Just Compensation of Intangible Detriment: Criteria for Legislative Modifi-
cations in California, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 491, 543-44 (1968-69). 
• 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
7 See Philbrick, Changing Concepts of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 691 (1938). 
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teenth century came increased regulation of land use. Since there 
were increased numbers of people in smaller spaces, there were 
many more ways in which land could be used harmfully. 
Twentieth century regulation of land use has expanded far be-
yond what a twelfth century landowner would have been able to 
foresee-yet our laws still reflect in many ways the "hands-off' 
attitude characteristic of early concepts of ownership.8 This tension 
between the increased need for regulation and the concept of owner-
ship rights as absolute has created revolutionary changes in prop-
erty law, while simultaneously creating the confusion which often 
accompanies rapid change. Society's confusion as to what rights 
inhere in "ownership" of real property is the largest single factor 
contributing to the present inadequacy of traditional concepts of 
permissible land use.S The difficulties in historic preservation re-
volve not around the general question of whether historic preserva-
tion is good policy, but rather around the legal ambivalence sur-
rounding the conflict of owner/developer versus society. "The diffi-
culties lie ... in the confusion concerning what this society's 
bottom-line perception of landed property's entitlements should 
be. "10 
While real property has retained much of the protection which 
traditional legal concepts afforded it in an agrarian society, the need 
for this protection has diminished with the concomitant rise in other 
sources of economic wellbeing which provide the basis for security 
in a technological society.1I Land has, however, become more impor-
tant in its value to society, as opposed to its value to the individual 
landowner, in that land use decisions made by the individual land-
owner are now an environmental concern to the community which 
is affected by those decisions. This heightened community concern 
has led to increasingly limited land use options available to the 
landowner, and is reflected in much greater governmental regula-
tion of land use. 12 Quite often this contraction of available choices 
concerning land use has led to dramatic changes in the value of real 
• See Large, This Land Is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 1973 WIS. 
L. REV. 1039. 
• See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) . 
• 0 Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 
HARV. L. REv. 402, 425 (1977). 
11 Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 1973 WIS. 
L. REv. 1039, 1040 . 
• 2 See Freilich, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: New Trends and Developments in Environ-
mental and Land-Use Controls, 1974!NST. OF PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 1. 
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estate. Favored parcels of land increase in value and, alternatively, 
unlucky landowners are subject to greater restrictions which invari-
ably result in decreased land value. 13 
Literally, land value is created-and destroyed-by governmen-
tal bodies, a concept which would have astonished those who devel-
oped early English property law, upon which our current legal sys-
tem of real property is in large part based. Simply stated, "[t]he l'" use and value of every tract of land in the United States today is affected more by what happens elsewhere than it is by any possible developments on the tract of land itself .... "14 This construction 
and destruction of land values due to government regulation has led 
to a new perception of land as property possessed of a bundle of 
rights. As land regulation, particularly historic preservation legisla-
tion, loosens the bundle and removes the rights traditionally inher-
ing in urban land ownership,. a point will be reached where the 
former landowner is left holding an empty bundle. Decisions which 
formerly would have been solely the landowner's are now subject to 
increased governmental involvement, involvement primarily caused 
by this progressive urbanization and industrialization. IS 
A substantial decrease in value often accompanies governmental 
involvement in land use decisions due to the greater restrictions 
placed upon land usage. The owner of an urban landmark (who has 
often, especially in a commercial context, borrowed heavily against 
the property's supposed value)18 finds himself holding the string 
13 Land which has been subjected to increased regulation diminishes in value. A purchaser 
usually obtains land not for some intrinsic value in the land itself, but rather purchases land 
to use it in some profitable way. The more uses that are excluded by regulation, the more 
potential purchasers will find the land unsuitable for their intended uses. As more potential 
buyers are eliminated from the market, the market value of the parcel will decline . 
.. Clawson, Introduction: Social Controls over Private Land Use, 22 S. DAK. L. REv. 479, 
492 (1977). 
" Freilich, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: New Trends and Developments in Environmen-
tal and Land-Use Controls, 1974INST. OF PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 1. 
II A mortgagee who has loaned money and in return has been granted a security interest 
in a historic structure might be understandably upset when new restrictions are placed upon 
the property's use. In a case where the mortgagor is a marginally profitable concern the 
elimination of some uses of the property could conceivably cause a mortgage default. Where 
the mortgagor is a prosperous concern, but unable to absorb the impact of new restrictions, 
the mortgage debt would probably have to be refinanced. Refinancing of the mortgage debt 
upon property which is subject to new restrictions will, without exception, be detrimental to 
the mortgagor, lessening the mortgagee's confidence in the mortgagor and causing institu-
tional lenders to view historic structures as financially unstable, high risk properties. These 
problems might be eliminated by the institution of a mortgage guarantee program as part of 
a historic preservation effort. See text at note 168, infra. 
For an illustration of the problems faced by owners of historic properties following designa-
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instead of the bundle after use restrictions are applied to his prop-
erty, and is understandably upset. To those who argue that this is 
a risk to which all who live in a civilized society are subject,17 the 
landowner answers: "[i]f 'the public' wants the land uses (or non-
uses) which benefit 'the public' generally, then 'the public' should 
buy the property, or an appropriate interest in the property, rather 
than attempt to force individual property owners to devote their 
property to public use without compensation. "18 This argument is 
a reflection of a long tradition equating real property with "private" 
property. The landowner's argument, however, may have fallen on 
more sympathetic ears in the fifteenth century, when concepts of 
landed property's generally unlimited entitlement were uniformly 
acknowledged and accepted as desirable to meet the needs of the 
land-owning (and law-making) community. These needs have 
changed and old formalistic legal doctrines l8 inadequately reflect 
the changing times. A man's home may be his castle, but woe unto 
he who builds where zoning prohibits castles. 
Historic properties within the central city which are, because of 
their location and other facilities, susceptible of commercial uses20 
present the dilemma in its sharpest detail: these properties are the 
ones that society can least afford to have destroyed or modified, and 
which the landowner can least afford not to develop.21 It is an eco-
tion of their property as a historic structure, see Town Hall Plan Dropped, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
11, 1979, at C15, col. 5 discussing the case of a popular New York City hall recently desig-
nated a historic structure. 
17 See J. LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, First Treatise § 40 et seq. (2d ed., Cam-
bridge Critical ed. 1970). 
10 Berger, To Regulate, or Not to Regulate-Is that the Question? Reflections on the Sup-
posed Dilemma between Environmental Protection and Private Property Rights, 8 Loy. 
(L.A.) L. REv. 253, 257 (1975). 
It See, e.g., Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). The idea of absolute 
ownership accompanying a fee simple interest is inappropriate in the late twentieth century. 
2IJ Residential properties will also be dealt with in this article, although not to the same 
extent. While residential properties present some of the same problems as do commercial 
properties, both the solutions available and regulatory efforts applied to the residential 
landowner are often different from those of owners of commercial historic properties. See 
Sussna, Effective Housing Rehabilitation and Neighborhood Preservation, 1978 INST. OF 
PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 91; Tondro, An Historic Preservation Approach to 
Municipal Rehabilitation of Older Neighborhoods, 8 CONN. L. REV. 248 (1976), for more 
information concerning problems of residential historic properties. 
21 With reference to such properties, the president of the National Trust for Historic Preser-
vation has recently stated that, "[w]ith current tax incentives available to developers and 
with the escalating value of land, the economic pressure for demolition and subsequent 
construction of a maximum-sized building is almost overpowering in the center of a city." 
Biddle, Historic Preservation: The Citizens' Quiet Revolution, 8 CONN. L. REv. 202, 207 
(1976). 
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nomic fact of urban life that, U[r]egrettably, the characteristics 
that make a building a charming landmark, particularly those of 
diminutive size and location in downtown areas of high land value, 
are often the same characteristics that make its retention as a land-
mark unprofitable."22 The public benefits immeasurably from the 
preservation of historic structures,!S but the effect of non-
compensatory regulation on the commercial landowner/developer 
may lead to his economic downfall. It is in this context then, that, 
as the forces of preservation and development collide, both devel-
opers and preservationists return to traditional legal principles to 
find support for their positions. Developers claim that ownership is 
absolute, preservationists point instead to the rights of the com-
munity to police its members. The present search for a balanced 
solution will begin with an analysis of the traditional legal doctrines 
utilized in this seemingly irreconcilable conflict. 24 
lll. OVERVIEW OF TRADmONAL EMINENT DOMAIN AND POLICE POWER 
REGULATION OF LAND USE 
The Fifth Amendment provides the largest single restraint on 
land regulation by its command that "private property [shall not] 
be taken for public use, without just compensation."21 Thus, the 
"taking clause" of the Fifth Amendment, held applicable to the 
states by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment,28 has iden-
21 C08tonis, The Disparity lSlue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 
HARv. L. REv. 402, 414-15 n.38 (1977). 
, II See NAT'L TRUST POR HISTORIC PusoVATlON, EcoNOMIC BBNUlTS or PusBRVING OLD r BUILDINGS (1976); Note, Urban Redevelopment and the Fiscal Crisis of the Central City, 21 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 820 (1978); Comment, Cultural EcololY: The Urban Landmark (JB on 
i Environmental Resource, 11 U.S.F. L. REv. 720 (1977); C. LoRD, TEACHING HISTORY Wl'l1l 
( COMMUNITY RBsoURCBS (1967); Goldstone, Aesthetics in Historic Districts, 36 LAw AND CON-
I TBMP. PRo •. 379 (1971); Baldwin, Historic Preservation in the Context of Environmental Low: 
'- Mutuollnterest in Amenity, 36 LAw AND CoNTBMP. PRo •. 432 (1971). 
14 A more exhaustive examination of the conflict of private (ownership) rights and collec. 
tive rights may be found in Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of 'Vust Compensation" Low. SO HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967). See also 
Beckwith, Developments in the Law of Historic Preservation and a Reflection on Liberty. 12 
WAKB FoRBST L. REv. 93 (1976); Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights. 57 AM. EcoN. 
RBv. 347 (1967); Metzger, Private Property and Environmental Sanity. 5 EcoLOGY L.Q. 793 
(1976); Thambyahpillai, The Right to Private Property and Problems on Land Reform. 18 
brr'L Soc. SCI. J. 69 (1966). 
21 "No person shall ... be deprived oflife, liberty, or property, without due proce88 oflaw; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compeniation." U.S. CONST. 
AMBND. V. 
21 Chicago B. &: Q. R.R. v. Ci~y of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Prior to the pauage of 
the Fourteenth Amendment the just compensation clause waa held to be inapplicable to the 
statea. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
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tified two significant and related areas of concern: the extent to 
which property can be regulated before it is "taken" and the ade-
quacy of "just compensation."27 The principles which underlie these 
two areas have varied with the needs and policies of the community 
at the time of the "taking. '(the Fourteenth Amendment,28 in addi-
tion to incorporating the sovereign's right of eminent domain re-
flected in the Fifth Amendment, also places procedural restraints 
on the states' regulatory processes by preventing a state from de-
priving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law." This safeguard does not require compensation but rather 
establishes defined procedures which the state must follow if it 
wishes to regulate or acquire any private property. Only eminent 
domain "takings," subject to the Fifth Amendment's just compen-
sation command, require compensation:l 
During the early nineteenth centurytbe police power was infre-
quently exercised in such a way as to cause substantial economic 
harm to the regulated property owner. 2t When regulation did affect 
an interest in land, rather than legitimizing the regulation as an 
exercise of police power, eminent domain condemnation proceed-
ings were used. Thus, the distinction between an eminent domain 
"taking" and the police power of the state to regulate land use was 
not a burning legal issue for the early nineteenth century courts. 31 
However, as urbanization and advancing technological achievement 
increased the need for regulated land use, the regulations more fre-
quently had serious economic impact upon landowners. Conse-
quently, courts were forced to draw guidelines defining the limits of 
a permissible non-compensatory regulation.3t An examination ofthe 
development of early case law shows the process of objectification 
of priorities assigned to parties in the conflict of collective rights 
17 These two questions-and their answers which reflect the community's current analysis 
of rights of property-have been a source of concern since at least the Roman Empire. See 
Matthews, The Valuation of Property in the Roman Law, 34 HARV. L. REv. 229 (1921). The 
right to just compensation following a taking and the concern with procedural safeguards to 
protect the taking process were first formalized in a document extorted from an unwitting 
and unwilling King John with just a hint of violence. See MAGNA CHARTA, ch. 39 (1215), which 
provided that "no free man shall be . . . deprived of his freehold . . . unless by the lawful 
judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." 
• U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, 0 1. "No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law .... " 
*' See Note, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings in Nineteenth Century 
America, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 854, 858-66 (1973). 
» [d. at 866-71. 
" [d. 
324 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 7:317 
versus private rights to be inconsistent and often contradictory. 32 
The United States Supreme Court has, however, made one state-
ment which has proven true in every case: "[t]here is no set for-
mula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins."33 
A. Early Application of Non-Compensatory Regulations 
It was not until the late nineteenth century in Mugler v. KansasM 
that the Supreme Court first articulated the relevant factors in 
determining whether a taking had occurred. Mugler had invested 
his life's savings in property, structures and equipment "for use in 
the manufacture of a malt liquor commonly known as beer. . . . "3. 
Subsequently, the Kansas Constitution was amended to forbid the 
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, and Mugler was left 
with a useless brewery. The opinion of the Court, written by Justice 
Harlan, accepted Mugler's assertion that if the statutes enacted to 
execute the amendment were enforced against Mugler, the value of 
his property would be materially diminished.:Ie Justice Harlan con-
cluded, however, that since the rights of ownership never included 
the right to use the land for noxious purposes, regulation of property 
so as to prohibit uses harmful to society took nothing away from the 
landowner.37 As the Court held: 
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are 
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or 
safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking 
or an appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such legislation 
does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful 
purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration 
3. Professor Van Alstyne has stated that "the decisional law is ... often explained in 
conclusionary terminology, circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric." Van Alstyne, Taking or 
Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 
I, 2 (1970). Other commentators have spoken without Professor Van Alstyne's elegance; 
Professor Dunham characterizes present land use law as subject to the "crazy-quilt pattern 
of Supreme Court doctrine." Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty 
Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REv. 63. The explanation for the 
absence of predictable objective decisional criteria has been perceptively identified to be that 
"[c)hanges in the notions of general welfare, health and safety, which set the outer limit of 
the police power, also compound the difficulty of distinguishing a regulation from a taking." 
Comment, Regulation of Land Use: From Magna Carta to a Just Formulation, 23 U.C.L.A. 
L. REv. 904, 905 n.5 (1976). 
33 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). 
:u 123 U,S. 623 (1887). 
35 Id. at 625. 
!WI Id. at 657. 
37 Id. at 668-69. 
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by the State that its use by anyone, for certain forbidden purposes, is 
prejudicial to the public interests. 3R 
The difficulty with this analysis is that society's definition of 
noxious purposes changes with the needs and policies of the times, 
and the landowner who relies on current ideas of acceptable prop-
erty uses may subsequently regret his reliance if he is forced to 
forfeit "rights" which a court now tells him he never had. However, 
while such a result may be unfortunate for the brewer, it is indispen-
sable for society to retain this regulatory ability without the burden 
of having to compensate every landowner whose expectations sud-
denly evaporate. As stated by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon,39 "Government could hardly go on if to some extent 
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying 
for every such change in the general law. "40 
Justice Harlan in Mugler saw the difference between a taking and 
a non-compensatory police power regulation as a difference in kind, 
not degree. He felt that ifthe regulation was in its nature an accept-
able regulation, then its impact upon the landowner was irrelevant. 
This differentiation between the nature of the regulation and the 
extent of its impact has played a continuously important role, al-
though its application has been inconsistent. 41 
The prevention of noxious uses as a justification for adversely 
affecting recognized economic interests finds its contemporary ex-
pression in zoning laws, probably the most intrusive and compre-
hensive regulation of land use today. 42 Zoning to prevent uses of land 
offensive to the community has been held to be a permissible exer-
cise of the police power even when prohibiting the most beneficial 
(profitable) use of the property. 43 Even the most extreme zoning 
case, prohibiting previously lawful uses of property and thus de-
stroying an existing use which has subsequently become offensive, 
is a permissible non-compensatory police power regulation. 44 
.. Id . 
.. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) . 
•• Id. at 413. 
" See generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See also text at notes 
59 and 60, infra . 
.. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Welch v. Swasey, 214 
U.S. 91 (1909) . 
.. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 692-93 (1962). See also Eastlake v. 
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 674 n.8 (1976) . 
.. The Court [in Miller] held that the State might properly make 'a choice between 
the preservation of one class of property and that of the other' and since the apple industry 
was important in the State involved, concluded that the State had not exceeded its 
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After the "prevention of noxious use" category, a second category 
of taking challenges which have been uniformly unsuccessful is that 
in which challenged governmental action has caused economic 
harm, but which the court has characterized as affecting interests 
that were not sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expecta-
tions of the claimant to constitute "property" for Fifth Amendment 
purposes. 45 Like the prohibition of noxious uses challenges, these 
challenges have failed on the theory that a landowner is not required 
to be compensated for economic loss caused by an impact upon an 
interest in land which is not part of the "bundle of rights" inhering 
in ownership of real property. It is to be emphasized, however, that 
community needs and perceptions contemporaneous with the tak-
ing challenge will be used to determine whether or not a taking has 
in fact occurred. This rapid shift in the community's perception of 
landed property's entitlements makes the outcomes of contempo-
rary taking challenges unpredictable. 48 
B. Elements of Eminent Domain "Takings" 
In contrast, courts have required compensation where the regula-
tion has involved both actual physical intrusion by the government 
to facilitate public functions and also has impacted upon recognized 
property interests. 47 As stated in Penn Central, "a taking may more 
readily be found when the interference with property can be charac-
terized as a physical invasion by the Government . . . than when 
interference [presumably non-physical interference] arises from 
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of eco-
nomic life to promote the common good. "48 
constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property (without 
compensation) in order to save another, which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of 
greater value to the public. 
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 126 (1978), citing with approval 
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928). 
For the implications ofthis legislative decision-making process see Costonis, The Disparity 
Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 HARV. L. REv. 402, 424-25 
(1977). But see Berger, The Accomodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to 
Professor Costonis, 76 COL. L. REv. 799, 820-21 (1976). See also Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) . 
•• See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945) (interest in 
highwater level of river for power generation purposes is not property); United States v. 
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913) (no property interest can exist in 
navigable waters) . 
.. See text at note 9, supra. 
n See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (overflights by heavy government 
aircraft held to have destroyed property's use as commercial chicken farm) . 
.. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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Another successful challenge to non-compensatory regulation of 
land use has been where the regulation has, although substantially 
furthering important public policies, destroyed distinct investment-
backed expectations.49 In such cases, the government is compelled 
to acquire the interest in property by exercising its right of eminent 
domain, thereby entitling the investor/landowner to the just com-
pensation required by the Fifth Amendment. As the leading case 
supporting this concept of forced acquisition, Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon5() deserves close scrutiny. 
In 1878 the Pennsylvania Coal Company conveyed surface rights 
to Mahon, but in express terms reserved the right to remove all the 
coal beneath the surface. The purchase agreement further provided 
that the grantee take the premises with risk and specifically waive 
all claims for damage to the property arising from subsidence of the 
surface caused by removal of the subsurface coal by the coal com-
pany. Subsequently, the Pennsylvania legislature passed an act 
which prohibited removal 'of subsurface coal in such a way as to 
cause subsidence of dwelling houses, public buildings, public streets 
and other rights of way. 61 Since providing supports for the overstrata 
as the coal was mined was economically infeasible, the coal com-
pany brought suit claiming that the coal which had to remain un-
mined in order to provide surface supports had been expropriated 
for a public use by the government. The coal company demanded 
compensation, claiming that a taking had occurred. Pennsylvania 
argued that such a regulation was a valid exercise of the police 
power to prevent harmful uses. As Justice Holmes, writing for the 
majority, stated: 
The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a 
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking 
. . . . We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to 
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the 
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the 
change.52 
.. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (government's complete de-
struction of a materialman's lien in certain property held a "taking"); Hudson Water Co. v. 
McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908) (if height restriction makes property wholly useless "the right 
of property prevails over the public interest" and compensation is required). See generally 
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just 
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1229-34 (1967). 
10 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
II [d. at 393-94 n.l. 
II [d. at 415-16. 
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Significantly, Justice Holmes viewed the difference between a per-
missible non-compensatory regulation and an eminent domain ac-
quisition of a right for the public good as a difference in degree. 53 
Justice Holmes thus departed from Justice Harlan's earlier identifi-
cation of the nature of the regulation as controlling, rather than the 
extent of its impact. Justice Brandeis, dissenting' in Pennsylvania 
Coal, was unable to distinguish Mugler and unwilling to accept the 
extent of the impact as dispositive.54 The underlying reasons, how-
ever, for Justice Holmes' decision were not philosophically different 
from Justice Harlan's but were, in fact, an objection to the method 
by which the community sought to obtain private property without 
compensation.55 
Justice Holmes also pointed to the lack of foresight of public 
officials who had obtained surface rights for the public,58 by pur-
chase or otherwise, without additionally purchasing the right of 
support for those surface facilities, and who now tried to obtain 
those previously overlooked rights through non-compensatory police 
power regulation. 
The rights of the public in a street purchased or laid out by eminent 
domain are those that it has paid for. If in any case its representatives 
have been so short sighted as to acquire only surface rights without the 
right of support, we see no more authority for supplying the latter with-
out com pensation than there was for taking the right of way in the first 
place and refusing to pay for it because the public wanted it very much. 
So far as private persons or communities have seen fit to take the risk 
of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their 
risk has become a danger warrants the giving to them greater rights than 
they bought.57 
Pennsylvania Coal may, perhaps, be better understood as support-
ing the proposition that government must compensate when re-
stricting uses of land which are harmful to the public, if such uses 
would not otherwise have been harmful but for government's initial 
" [d, at 416 . 
.. See text at note 61, infra. 
50 See text at note 57, infra . 
.. Pennsylvania had prohibited, by the instant legislation, mining of coal in such a way as 
to cause subsidence of any: public building or structure used by the public; street, road, 
bridge or public passageway; track, roadbed, right of way used in the service of the public; 
dwelling, factory, store or other industrial or mercantile establishment; and, cemetery or 
public burial ground. 260 U.S. 393, 393-94 n.l (1922). 
57 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922). 
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intrusion. Justice Holmes' decision was primarily based not on a 
legal distinction concerning the nature of the regulation or the ex-
tent of its impact but rather on his common sense view that half 
measures do not become whole measures by combining half price 
plus police power regulation. This aspect of the case has apparently 
been underappreciated by the commentators.58 Thus, while Justice 
Holmes' opinion is based primarily upon the extent of regulation,59 
he did not view the nature of the regulation as unrelated.80 That 
Justice Holmes was less than candid in his opinion has caused diffi-
culty in later years as the legal community struggles to reconcile 
Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal. The reconciliation lies not in the 
factual distinction between the cases, but rather lies in recognizing 
the flexibility of traditional legal concepts which would have per-
mitted a variety of outcomes in either case. 
Justice Brandeis, dissenting, was unable to distinguish 
Pennsylvania Coal from Mugler v. Kansas. 
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the 
police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and 
is, in that sense, an abridgement by the state of rights in property 
without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the 
public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. 
The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious 
use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. 
The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely 
prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount 
rights of the public. 81 
While Justice Holmes had stated that an exercise of police power 
would be justified if it secured to all an "average reciprocity of 
advantage,"82 he was unable to find the advantage gained by the 
coal company: Justice Brandeis found it in "the advantage of living 
and doing business in a civilized community."83 
.. See, e.g., Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal 
Decision, 91 HARV. L. REv. 402 (1977); Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use 
Controversies: A Reply To Professor Costonis, 76 COL. L. REv. 799 (1976) . 
.. "This [the extent of the intrusion) is a question of degree-and therefore cannot be 
disposed of by general propositions." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 
(1922) (emphasis added) . 
.. "[U]sually in ordinary private affairs the public interest does not warrant much of this 
kind of interference." Id. at 413 (emphasis added) . 
• , Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J. dissenting) . 
•• Id. at 415. 
u Id. at 422 (Brandeis, J. dissenting). 
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The principle for which Pennsylvania Coal is most often cited84 is 
that "[w]hen it [the diminution of property value] reaches a cer-
tain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise 
of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act."65 The 
Court did not more specifically identify the certain magnitude nor 
identify what fact situations would not require compensation once 
the "certain degree" of regulation was reached, although clearly 
that possibility was left open for a few cases. Whichever cases do not 
require compensation even though the regulation has reached a 
"certain magnitude" could only be excepted from the rule by the 
nature of the regulation. This point is the furthest the Court's logic 
can be applied, although it is at this point that the kind/degree 
distinction is needed most. Pennsylvania Coal, while an aberration 
because of its unique fact situation which gives rise to Justice 
Holmes' displeasure, does explore the requirements of a taking in 
familiar kind/degree terms. Although the kind/degree terminology 
is consistently used in all the taking cases, the outcomes of these 
cases are often inconsistent. 
Even if a court determines that compensation is warranted, a 
question remains as to the amount and type to be awarded. In other 
words, if a court determines that the nature of the regulation is 
acceptable and that the diminution in property value is of insuffi-
cient magnitude to require compensation, that ends the inquiry: the 
burden is allocated totally to the landowner. If, however, due to the 
magnitude of the property's devaluation or the nature of the regula-
tion the cost is to be borne by the community, a determination must 
be made as to the amount and type of compensation to which the 
affected landowner is entitled. 
C. Amount of Compensation in "Taking" Cases 
A landowner who suffers an adverse economic impact due to po-
lice power regulation-for example, due to a zoning ordinance,8ft 
which is the most common permissible non-compensatory regula-
tion-normally has no recourse against the community and must 
bear the loss himself. An act which isa valid exercise of the police 
.. See, e.g., Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 
1973 WIS. L. REv. 1039, 1052. 
II 260 U.S. at 413 (Holmes, J.). As noted earlier, some of the emphasis applied to this 
frequently cited proposition may be misplaced. See text at note 57. supra . 
.. A zoning ordinance is also the best regulation which comfortably fits Justice Holmes' 
justification for the police power-to assure each member of the community "an average 
reciprocity of advantage." 260 U.S. at 415. See text at note 62, supra. 
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power is by definition non-compensatory. However, for land the 
value of which is reduced under the eminent domain power, either 
through outright expropriation or an excessive or impermissible use 
of police power, the landowner is compensated under the Fifth 
Amendment's requirement of "just compensation." "Just compen-
sation" has been uniformly interpreted to be a generous standard, 
reflecting not only the fair market value for the land considering the 
use to which it is being put at the time of condemnation but also 
with reference to the highest and most profitable use for which the 
property is suitable and to which the property could be converted 
in the reasonably near future.1? Additionally, the highest and best 
use valuation must take into account any increment of value which 
may result from the affected property's being used in conjunction 
with other parcels.'s This disparity in treatment between "taken" 
and "non-taken" property makes the classification of the govern-
ment action of great concern to the regulated landowner," and in-
creases the need for consistency in defining the point at which regu-
lation becomes a taking. In attempting to delineate the boundary 
beyond which a regulation becomes a taking courts have formulated 
various standards, each of which uses various criteria producing a 
wide variety of results. No standard has been uniformly accepted or 
even uniformly applied, even though in land use litigation the iden-
tification of the appropriate standard will often be the dispositive 
factor. 
IV. HISTORIC PRESERVATION LEGISLATION AS POLICE POWER 
REGULATION 
In examining historic preservation legislation as police power reg-
ulation, case law shows that "fourteenth amendment objections are 
stilled when zoning leaves the landowner with a 'reasonable benefi-
cial use'-that hypotpetical residuum of private utility which is a 
prerequisite for valid regulation."70 This reasonable beneficial use 
., See, e.g., United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396 
(1949); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 
(1934) . 
.. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973). 
II For a comprehensive and articulate discussion of the disparity controversy in the context 
of the New York Court of Appeals decision in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 
42 N.Y.2d 324,366 N.E.2d 1271 (1977), see C08tonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the 
Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 HAav. L. REv. 402 (1977). 
71 Costonis, supra note 69 at 407; see also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 
365 (1926); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928). 
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standard, which is the standard presently used, is a closely tailored 
evaluation of the point at which the police power is exercised to an 
excessive degree. It presupposes that the nature of the regulation is 
permissible, and analyzes only the extent of the intrusion. The rea-
sonable beneficial use standard is an outgrowth of zoning case law. 
Simply stated, any exercise of the police power for permissible pur-
poses which leaves the landowner with a single reasonable l:!eneficial 
use is a valid police power regulation, leaving the owner without 
compensation. 
Many historic properties are marginally profitable properties 
which, if development were permitted, could be renovated or rebuilt 
to yield a more handsome profit. 71 Consequently, the owner/ 
developer often has both the capability and incentive to prove 
that a police power regulation has impacted upon the necessary 
residuum of private usefulness, made impossible a reasonable 
beneficial use and thus effected a taking, either through expropria-
tion or overregulation. This is, in fact, the typical challenge made 
to much historic preservation legislation. 
At the outset historic preservation legislation must confront a 
major policy decision: whether historic preservation should be en-
couraged by public acquisition and ownership of historic structures 
or should be based on providing incentives to stimulate private 
ownership and management of historic structures. Generally, the 
greatest benefits72 are provided by private involvement in preserva-
tion activities,73 and, while state preservation authority should be 
active in acquiring and managing historic structures which the pri-
vate market will not support, the state's major role should be that 
of assuring viability to private preservation activities. 
Legislation providing for the public ownership and management of 
historic property does not provide an adequate response to current needs 
for landmark preservation. For many reasons, widespread public owner-
ship of historic property is not feasible. Publicly-owned property may 
be expensive to acquire and maintain. It is no longer a source of tax 
71 See Town Hall Plan Dropped, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1979, at C15, col. 5. 
71 See NAT'L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PREsERVATION, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PRESERVING OLD 
BUILDINGS (1976); Note, Urban Redevelopment and the Fiscal Crisis of the Central City, 21 
ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 820 (1978); Comment, Cultural Ecology: The Urban Landmark as an 
Environmental Resource, 11 U.S.F. L. REv. 720 (1977); C. LORD, TEACHING HISTORY WITH 
COMMUNITY REsOURCES (1967); Goldstone, Aesthetics in Historic Districts, 36 LAW AND CON-
TEMP. PROB. 379 (1971); Baldwin, Historic Preservation in the Context of Environmental Law: 
Mutual Interest in Amenity, 36 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 432 (1971). 
7S See Gold, The Welfare Economics of Historic Preservation, 8 CONN. L. REV. 348 (1976). 
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revenue. It is likely to be removed from economically productive uses. 
It is necessarily limited in scope and is hardly a feasible technique for 
the control of neighborhoods or areas, particularly in urban communi-
ties. Hence, the most significant role of state legislation and the greatest 
opportunity for innovative policy-making probably lies in the area of 
providing such services, standards, controls, and incentives as will en-
courage the practice of preservation techniques by private owners and 
users of historic property. 74 
Incentives provided to private efforts to preserve historic structures 
vary according to what the particular state or municipality views as 
the objectives to be achieved for the benefit of the community, the 
primary objectives being economic75 and cultural,78 The most com-
prehensive programs create tax incentives to stimulate private his-
toric preservation efforts.77 These incentives will be examined more 
closely in the context of the New York City Historic Preservation 
Law78 which is discussed herein as a representative statute. 
A. The New York City Landmark Preservation Law 
The New York City Landmark Preservation Law is typical of 
many historic preservation laws in the United States78 in that "its 
primary method of achieving its goals is not by acquisitions of his-
toric properties, but rather by involving public entities in land use 
decisions affecting these properties and providing services, stan-
dards, controls, and incentives that will encourage preservation by 
private owners and users."80 The statute is implemented by the 
7< Wilson & Winkler, The Response of State Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 LAw 
AND CONTEMP. PROD. 329, 330-31 (1971). See also Johnson, The Role of Public Attitude and 
Involvement in the Preservation Movement, 8 CONN. L. REv. 370 (1976); Gold, The Welfare 
Economics of Historic Preservation, 8 CONN. L. REv. 348 (1976). 
71 See NAT'L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PREsERVATION, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PRESERVING OLD 
BUILDINGS (1976); Note, Urban Redevelopment and the Fiscal Crisis of the Central City, 21 
ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 820 (1978). 
7, See Comment, Cultural Ecology: The Urban Landmark as an Environmental Resource, 
11 U.S.F. L. REv. 720 (1977); C. LORD, TEACHING HISTORY WITH COMMUNITY RESOURCES (1967); 
Goldstone, Aesthetics in Historic Districts, 36 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROD. 379 (1971); Baldwin, 
Historic Preservation in the Context of Environmental Law: Mutual Interest in Amenity, 36 
LAw AND CONTEMP. PROD. 432 (1971). 
77 See note 92, infra. 
78 New York City Administrative Code, Ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 et seq. (1976). 
7. "The act is distinct, however, from most others in its broad definition of the subjects it 
seeks to preserve-landmarks, landmark sites, historic districts, exterior architectural fea-
tures, and others." Rankin, Operation and Interpretation of the New York City Landmarks 
Preservation Law, 36 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROD. 366, 367 (1971). See also Brenneman, Historic 
Preservation Restrictions: A Sampling of State Statutes, 8 CONN. L. REv. 231 (1976). For 
foreign preservation programs, see note 177, infra . 
.. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1978) (citations 
omitted). 
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Landmarks Preservation Commission, an eleven-member8! agency 
vested with authority to designate structures as landmarks, and 
areas as historic districts if the area contains improvements which: 
(a) have a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest 
or value; and 
(b) represent one or more periods or styles of architecture typical of 
one or more eras in the history of the city; and 
(c) cause such area, by reason of such factors, to constitute a distinct 
section of the city. . . .82 
Once a structure or area qualifies, in the Commission's opinion, as 
a designated landmark or historic district, a public hearing is then 
held at which the owner and other affected or interested persons are 
given the opportunity to comment on the desirability of the pro-
posed designation. Following this hearing the Commission may des-
ignate a building to be a "landmark,"83 situated on a particular 
"landmark site, "84 or may designate an area to be an "historic dis-
trict."85 If the Commission decides to designate the property as a 
landmark, landmark site or historic district, New York City's Board 
of Estimate may modify or disapprove the designation,88 and the 
"' The ordinance requires that the Commission include at least three architects, one histo-
rian qualified in historic preservation, one city planner or landscape architect, one realtor, 
and at least one resident of each of the city's five boroughs. New York City Administrative 
Code, Ch. 8-A § 534 (1976). In addition, the Commission has traditionally included one or 
two lawyers with experience in municipal government and several laymen with no specialized 
qualifications other than concern for the good of the city. Goldstone, Aesthetics in Historic 
Districts, 36 LAw AND CONTBMP. PRos. 379, 384-85 (1971). 
IZ New York City Administrative Code, Ch. 8-A 0 207-1.0(h)(l) (1976). Landmarks are 
chosen through the application of similar criteria. 
I. 'Landmark.' Any improvement, any part of which is thirty years or older, which 
has a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of the 
development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state or nation and which has 
been designated as a landmark pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. 
Id. 0 207-1.0(n). 
14 'Landmark site.' An improvement parcel or part thereof on which is situated a land-
mark and any abutting improvement parcel or part thereof used as and constituting part 
of the premises on which the landmark is situated, and which has been designated as a 
landmark site pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. 
Id. § 207-1.0(0) . 
.. 'Historic district.' Any area which: (1) contains improvements which: (a) have a 
special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value; and (b) represent one 
or more periods or styles of architecture typical of one or more eras in the history of the 
city; and (c) cause such area, by reason of such factors, to constitute a distinct section of 
the city; and (2) has been designated as a historic district pursuant to the provisions of 
this chapter. 
Id. § 207-1.0(h). The Act also provides for the designation of "scenic landmarks," see id. § 
207.1.0(w), and "interior landmarks," see id. § 207-1.0(m) . 
.. In formulating its decision the Board of Estimate must consider the relationship of the 
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owner may then seek judicial review of the final designation deci-
sion. 
Final designation as a landmark results in several major restric-
tions being placed on the property owner's use of the landmark site. 
The owner remains free to modify the interior of his landmark, 
although such modification must comply with other applicable zon-
ing ordinances. The Commission must approve any modification, 
alteration or reconstruction of the exterior of the landmark.87 The 
ordinance establishes three methods of obtaining such approval. 
First, the owner may apply to the Commission for a "certificate of 
no effect on architectural features" which will be granted if the 
alteration does not affect any architectural features of the landmark 
and will harmonize with the landmark's historic features. 88 Denial 
of the certificate is subject to judicial review. 8D Second, the owner 
may apply for a "certificate of appropriateness" which, if obtained, 
evidences the Commission's conclusion that, after considering the 
property's aesthetic, historical and architectural values, the pro-
posed construction on the landmark site would not unduly hinder 
the pTotection, enhancement, perpetuation and use of the land-
mark. Do Denial of this certificate is also subject to judicial review. 
The third procedure available to the owner is that he may seek a 
"certificate of appropriateness" based on the ground of "insufficient 
return."DI The purpose of this certificate is to ensure that the desig-
nation does not cause severe economic hardship. The procedure for 
obtaining such a certificate varies depending upon whether the 
property is taxable or tax-exempt.D2 
designated property "to the master plan, the zoning resolution, projected public improve-
ments and any plans for the renewal of the area involved." [d. § 207-2.0(g)(I). 
"' [d. §§ 207-4.0-207-9.0. 
" [d. § 207-5.0 . 
•• 438 U.S. 104, 112 (1978) . 
•• New York City Administrative Code, Ch. 8-A § 207-6.0(c) (1976). 
" [d. § 207-8.0. 
" If the owner of a non-tax-exempt parcel has 'been denied certificates of appropriate-
ness for a proposed alteration and shows that he is not earning a reasonable return on the 
property in this present state, the Commission and other city agencies must assume the 
burden of developing a plan that will enable the landmark owner to earn a reasonable 
return on the landmark site. The plan may include, but need not be limited to, partial or 
complete tax exemption, remission of taxes, and authorizations for alterations, construc-
tion or reconstruction appropriate for and not inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. 
§ 207-8.0(c). The owner is free to accept or reject a plan devised by the Commission and 
approved by the other city agencies. If he accepts the plan, he proceeds to operate the 
property pursuant to the plan. If he rejects the plan, the Commission may recommend 
that the city proceed by eminent domain to acquire a protective interest in the landmark, 
but if the city does not do so within a specified time period, the Commission must issue a 
336 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 7:317 
The New York City landowner does gain one significant economic 
advantage by the landmark designation. Under New York City's 
zoning laws owners of any real property who have not developed 
their property to the full extent permitted by the applicable (non-
landmark) zoning laws are allowed to transfer the unused develop-
ment rights to contiguous parcels on the same city block.B3 Land-
mark owners, as compared with other owners, have a broa<;ler range 
of recipient parcels (contiguous and non-contiguous) to which they 
may transfer the development rights which would have attached to 
their property but for its landmark designation. B4 In other words, if 
a ten story building in an area which is zoned for a maximum height 
limitation of forty stories is designated a landmark, the owner would 
then be prohibited from building his otherwise allowable thirty sto-
notice allowing the property owner to proceed with the alteration or improvement as 
originally proposed in his application for a certificate of appropriateness. 
Tax·exempt structures are treated somewhat differently. They become eligible for spe-
cial treatment only if four preconditions are satisfied: (1) the owner previously entered 
into an agreement to sell the parcel that was contingent upon the issuance of a certificate 
of approval; (2) the property, as it exists at the time of the request, is not capable of 
earning a reasonable return; (3) the structure is no longer suitable to its past or present 
purposes; and (4) the prospective buyer intends to alter the landmark structure. In the 
event the owner demonstrates that the property in its present state is not earning a 
reasonable return, the Commission must either find another buyer for it or allow the sale 
and construction to proceed. 
But this is not the only remedy available for owners of tax-exempt landmarks .... 
[I)f an owner files suit and establishes that he is incapable of earning a "reasonable re-
turn" on the site in its present state, he can be afforded judicial relief. Similarly, where a 
landmark owner who enjoys a tax exemption has demonstrated that the landmark struc-
ture, as restricted, is totally inadequate for the owner's "legitimate needs, II the Act has 
been held invalid as applied to that parcel. See Lutheran Church in America v. City of 
New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121 (1974). 
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 112-13 n.13 (1978). 
Literature on tax treatment of historic structures includes: Note, State and Federal Tax 
Incentives for Historic Preservation, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 833 (1977); Note, Landmark Preserva-
tion: The Problem of the Tax-Exempt Owner, 3 FORD. U. L.J. 123 (1974); Shull, How to Use 
the Tax System to Promote Historic Preservation, 4 REAL EST. L.J. 39'8 (1976); Shull, The 
Use of Tax Incentives for Historic Preservation, 8 CONN. L. REv. 334 (1976); Note, Historic 
Preservation and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 11 U.S.F. L. REv. 453 (1976); Tucker & Shull, 
Tax Advantages and Problems Connected with "Certified Historic Structures, " 48 J. TAX. 
40 (1978) . 
• 3 New York City Zoning Resolution, Art. I, Ch. 2, § 12-10 (1978) . 
.. An owner who is subjected to increased restrictions under a regular zoning ordinance is 
not allowed to transfer the development rights he would have had but for the new zoning 
restriction. On the other hand, an owner subjected to increased restrictions under the land-
mark ordinance may transfer whatever development rights he had prior to the landmark 
designation. The landmark owner may transfer these development rights after the landmark 
restrictions have already been imposed. Thus the burdens imposed by the landmark ordi-
nance are quite different from those imposed by regular (non-landmark) zoning restrictions. 
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ries. The owner would, under the New York City ordinance, be able 
to sell the development rights to his neighbor in the same zoning 
district who would then be able to build a seventy story building, 
using his right to build forty stories and adding the development 
rights to thirty stories he purchased from the landmark owner. This 
process is variously referred to as transferable development rights 
or air rights transfer. These rights are very valuable in many urban 
centers since the only place to build is up. 
This concept of transferable development rights (TDR) is a rela-
tively new approach to land use planning and regulation and prom-
ises to become widely applied.85 Although the constitutionality of 
specific TDR plans has been questioned," the technique, if knowl-
edgeably used, is an effective means of minimizing the economic 
impact of a police power regulation, thereby preventing the regula-
tion from amounting to a taking. Since the ordinance establishes 
the reasonable beneficial use standard to be a 6 percent return on 
investment,97 if a TDR alone amounts to a 6 percent return a tak-
ing would be prevented on the property from which the rights were 
being transferred. 
It is generally believed that the benefits of TDR's outweigh their 
drawbacks: 
TDRs are generally superior to other methods of protecting valuable 
landscapes and landmarks because they impose relatively little cost on 
the public, they are essentially self-working market operations that are 
difficult to thwart if properly planned, and because they provide some 
compensation to landowners whose privileges of conversion are re-
stricted. Implementing a TDR Program requires a sophisticated under-
•• For an excellent analysis of the application and utility of TOR's see Marcus, Mandatory 
Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhattan's Tudor City 
Parks, 24 BUFF. L. REv. 77 (1975). See also French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 
N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381,385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976). 
II The Supreme Court has frequently held that compensation must be the full monetary 
equivalent of the property taken. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970); 
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United 
States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893); Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329, 1334 (5th Cir. 1973). 
There are, however, no cases in which the court has confronted the issue of nonmonetary 
compensation, so it is still an open question. Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 
U.S. 102, 149-54 (1974). It may eventually be decided under traditional compensation princi· 
pIes that TOR's are inadequate not only because they are not a sum certain payment and 
hence may be of unequal value to the property taken but also because it is nonmonetary 
compensation. 
For further discussion of the constitutionality of TOR's, see Note, The Unconstitution· 
ality of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101 (1975). 
" New York City Administrative Code, Ch. 8-A § 207-1.0(q) (1970). 
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standing of the interrelationships between the various sub markets for 
housing, commercial floorspace, land, etc. Without such knowledge, use 
of TDRs may prove ineffectual or frustrating. uM 
The New York City Landmark Preservation Law is an example 
of a comprehensive police power regulation which seeks to preserve 
the aesthetic, cultural and historic architecture within the city by 
preventing unauthorized alteration or destruction of designated 
structures. Provided within the ordinance itself are the mechanisms 
through which an owner might seek exception from the statute, 
compensation through tax advantages and, additionally, permission 
to transfer the unused development rights from the landmark site 
to a designated parcel. Although the ordinance is comprehensive, it 
is also complex and may have a serious financial impact upon own-
ers of historic property. Some basic questions challenging the essen-
tial nature of the regulatory scheme have arisen in litigation under 
the ordinance: does this ordinance leave the owner with a 
"reasonable beneficial use-that hypothetical residuum of private 
utility which is a prerequisit for valid regulation"?DD Or, alter-
natively, does this regulation infringe to such an extent that it 
amounts to a taking, compelling acquisition by the government 
through eminent domain procedures with "just compensation"? If 
it is a taking, does the combination of tax advantages and TDR's 
amount to "just compensation"? 
B. Early Litigation Under the New York City Landmark 
Preservation Law 
Litigation under the New York City Landmark Preservation 
II Berry &: Steiker, An Economic Analysis of Transfer of Development Rights, 17 NAT. 
REsoURCES J. 55, 73 (1977). 
Although TDR's are a recent development, the concept has spawned a rather extensive 
bibliography. Among the more prominent articles are: Rose, Psychological, Legal and Admin-
istrative Problems of the Proposal to Use the Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) as a 
Technique to Preserve Open Space, 6 URS. LAw. 919 (1974); Costonis, Development Rights 
Transfer: A Proposal for Financing Landmarks Preservation, 1 REAL EST. L.J. 163 (1972); 
Schnidman, Transferable Development Rights: An Idea in Search of Implementation, 11 
LAND AND WATER L. REv. 339 (1976); Castonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory 
Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973); Rose, Transfer of Development Rights: A Preview of an 
Evolving Concept, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 330 (1975); Carmichael, Transferable Development 
Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control, 2 FLA. ST. L. REv. 35 (1974). 
For a more extensive listing see RUTGERS U., DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS BIBLIOGRAPHY, LEAFLET 
No. 533 (1976). For an excellent analysis of the New York City approach to TDR~, see Note, 
Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338 (1972). 
II Castonis, supra note 69, at 407; see also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 
365 (1926); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928). 
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LawlOO has established the reasonable beneficial use test as the ap-
propriate standard to be applied in historic preservation cases. Al-
though this test is now clearly defined and widely accepted, courts 
have experimented with a wide variety of standards, some of which 
will be examined in this section. Occasionally, some of these stan-
dards are a radical departure from today's reasonable beneficial use 
test. An early standard which was utilized in a historic preservation 
case, for example, even questioned the legitimacy of the state's 
interest in historic preservation, going so far as to hold that when 
historic preservation was the purpose of land use regulation a 
stricter standard than the usual reasonable beneficial use test was 
to be applied. lol While the United States Supreme CourtlO2 and the 
New York State Court of AppealslO3 now recognize the reasonable 
beneficial use test as the appropriate test in historic preservation 
litigation, the earlier cases, reflecting various solutions to this con-
flict between the community and the private landowner, deserve a 
close examination for their historical, although not precedential, 
value. 
The first major case challenging the New York preservation stat-
ute, Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor v. Platt,104 involved 
Sailor's Snug Harbor, a charitable home for retired seamen which 
used designated landmark structures (dating back to 1830) as dor-
mitories for its residents. The institution planned to demolish the 
landmark structures and replace them with modem high-rise build-
ings. In challenging the landmark preservation ordinance the owner 
claimed that the ordinance's distinction between taxpaying and 
tax-exempt ownersl05 constituted unreasonable discrimination and 
thus violated both the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Section 11, Article I ofthe New York State Consti-
tution. loa The trial court, while not reaching the unlawful discrimi-
nation contention, vacated the landmark designation on the 
'00 New York City Administrative Code, Ch. 8-A §§ 207-4.0-207-9.0 (1976). 
'0' Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor v. Platt, 53 Misc. 2d 933,280 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. 
Ct. 1967), rev'd, 29 App. Div. 2d 376,288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968). But see Lutheran Church in 
America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974). 
,02 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S . .104 (1978). 
'03 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977). 
, .. 53 Misc. 2d 933, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1967), rev'd 29 App. Div. 2d 376, 288 
N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968). 
,.. See note 92, supra. 
'01 Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor v. Platt, 53 Misc. 2d 933,936,280 N.Y.S.2d 75,78 
(Sup. Ct. 1967), rev'd, 29 App. Div. 2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968). 
f 
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grounds that the public benefit derived from the landmark did not 
justify the burden on the owner, and that the limits of reasonable 
regulation had been exceeded: the ordinance was, therefore, found 
to be an unlawful taking of property without just compensation. lo7 
While the decision cites Justice Holmes' degree test from 
Pennsylvania Coal,l08 it also introduces a balancing test typical of 
discrimination cases. lot The Snug Harbor court held that, "the regu-
lation imposes so disproportionate a burden upon the landowner 
that it must be set aside .... "110 The court further identified the 
designation as unlawful "spot zoning"111 since it was an individual 
landmark designation\1Z and not an historic districtll3 (and therefore 
each parcel did not receive an "average reciprocity of advantage" 114 
to compensate for the regulation).1lI The Appellate Divisionll8 re-
117 Id. at 937-38, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 79. 
I .. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see Trustees of the Sailor's Snug 
Harbor v. Platt, 53 Misc. 2d 933,937, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75, 78-79 (1967). 
I" "The regulation imposes so disproportionate a burden upon the landowner that it must 
be set aside in this case as an unlawful taking of property without just compensation." Id., 
53 Misc. 2d at 937, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 79 (1967) (citations omitted). See also note 110, infra. 
III Id., 53 Misc. 2d at 937, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 79 (1967). The balancing test is characteristic 
of a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge. This test is no longer used due to 
later cases holding that economic regulation is unconstitutional only if there is no rational 
basis for believing that the regulation furthers a legitimate state interest. See Village of Belle 
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
III Spot zoning is "the process of singling out a small parcel of land for a use classification 
totally different from that of the surrounding area, for the benefit of the owner of such 
property tand to the detriment of other owners. . . ." Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 
N.Y. 115, 123, 96 N.E.2d 731, 734 (1951) (citations omitted). Sometimes, but more rarely, 
the term spot zoning is used to describe the reverse propoaiton, namely that in which a single 
lot is more severely restricted than other properties in the same area. (This is occasionally 
called "reverse spot zoning.") The identification of individual historic structures as subject 
to greater restrictions than their neighbors might be categorized as spot zoning. However, if 
the zoning is in accordance with a comprehensive plan and serves the general welfare it would 
withstand a spot zoning attack. See 2 RATHKOPF, TIm LAw or ZONING AND PLANNING, Ch. 26 
(4th ed. 1978). 
Zoning problems relating to historic preservation are explored in Note, Landmark Preserva-
tion: The Problem of the Single Landmark-Lutheran Church in America v. City of New 
York, 25 DEPAUL L. REv. 160 (1975). See also NAT'L TRUST roR HISTORIC PREsERVATION, A 
GUIDE TO DELINEATING EooB8 or HISTORIC DISTRICTS (1976); Pyke, Architectural Controls and 
the Individual Landmark, 36 LAw AND CONTBMP. PRos. 398 (1971). For an interesting analysis 
of spot zoning as a Canadian problem, see Giroux, "Spot Zoning •.. Discrimination et Interet 
Public en Droit Canadienet Quebecois, 16 CABlER DE DRorr 177 (1975). 
III See note 83, supra. 
113 See note 85, supra. 
114 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see text at note 62, supra .. 
III Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor v. Platt, 53 Misc. 2d 933,937,280 N.Y.S.2d 75,78 
(Sup. Ct. 1967), rev'd, 29 App. Div. 2d 376,288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968). . 
III The New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, is not the court of last resort 
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versed and remanded, concluding that the cultural benefit to the 
community justified the exercise of the police power. 117 The appel-
late court did, however, remand the case for further factual analysis 
involving the ordinance's provisions for relief of affected charitable 
institutions. liS 
In Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York 119 the New 
York City ordinance was again challenged following the landmark 
designation of Morgan House, the former Madison Avenue resi-
dence of J.P. Morgan and at the time of the controversy the offices 
of the Lutheran church. The Lutheran church, owner of the prop-
erty, sought to demolish Morgan House and construct a nineteen 
story office building on the site. 120 The church could not qualify for 
relief under the statutory provisions. 121 The Commission refused to 
relax the restrictions on demolition, prompting the church to seek 
declaratory relief contending that either the law, or its application 
in this instance, was unconstitutional,122 The New York State Court 
of Appeals stated that a police power regulation becomes confisca-
tory when government "takes unto itself private resources in use for 
the common good .... "123 This is an application of the "nature of 
but is rather the state intermediate appellate court. The Court of Appeals is the state's 
highest court. 
117 Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 App. Div. 2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 
(1968). 
II. Chapter 8-A provides some guidelines as to what constitutes an undue burden on 
commercial realty and provides relief in such instances (§ 207-8.0, subd. a). However, the 
corresponding provisions in regard to property devoted to charitable uses are limited to 
the instances where the institution desires to alienate the property by sale or lease (§ 207-
8.0, subd. a par. [1], subpar. [b], cl. (2». We agree with Special Term that this does 
not render the statute unconstitutional. It must be interpreted as giving power to the 
commission to provide relief in the situation covered by the statute, but ~ot restricting 
the court from so doing in others. The criterion for commercial property is where the 
continuance of the landmark prevents the owner from obtaining an adequate return. A 
comparable test for a charity would be where maintenance of the landmark either physi-
cally or financially prevents or seriously interferes with carrying out the charitable pur-
pose. In this instance the. answer would depend on the proper resolution of subsidiary 
questions, namely, whether the preservation of these buildings would seriously interfere 
with the use of the property, whether the buildings are capable of conversion to a useful 
purpose without excessive cost, or whether the cost of maintaining them without use 
would entail serious expenditure-all in the light of the purposes and resources of the 
petitioner. 
[d. at 378, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316. 
The case was not retried: the city entered into negotiations with the institution for the 
acquisition of the property. 
II. 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305,359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974) . 
• 211 [d. at 124-25, 316 N.E.2d at 307, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 10-11.· 
12. [d. at 124, 316 N.E.2d at 307, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 10. 
12' [d. at 125, 316 N.E.2d at 308,359 N.Y.S.2d at 11. 
12' [d. at 128-29, 316 N.E.2d at 310,359 N.Y.S.2d at 14. Significantly, while the majority 
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the regulation" test similar to that used by Justice Harlan in 
Mugler. 124 The holding, simply stated, is that landmark preservation 
is not the kind of regulation which is sustainable under the police 
power. The reason it is not sustainable is not identified by the court, 
although it is plainly not solely a question of degree. This approach 
is interesting because "landmark preservation ordinances tradition-
ally have been upheld under the police power on the basis of eco-
nomic benefits accruing to the tourist industry."125 Citing with ap-
proval the rule in Sailor's Snug Harbor, 128 the court also stated that 
the regulation amounts to confiscation when the owner has been 
"deprived of the reasonable use of its land."127 Although the 
Lutheran Church court echoed the familiar "reasonable use" termi-
nology, that standard played a very different role in its decision. 
Plaintiff established a hardship consisting of projected organizational 
goals which would be frustrated and one reasonable land use-a central-
ized headquarters located on the Morgan property-which would be 
denied by operation of the preservation law [as opposed to the elimina-
tion of all reasonable land uses]. The court, as a consequence, held that 
this degree of interference, when coupled with the accretion to city 
resources, constituted a taking within the confines of the definition it 
had developed. 128 
Previously, New York State courts had identified the point at 
which a police power regulation becomes confiscatory to be when 
the "ordinance precludes the use of the property for any purpose for 
which it is reasonably adapted."129 The Lutheran Church court, 
chose to relieve the church on the basis of "economic hardship," the dissent applied a more 
objective standard which has since become part of the most widely used test, that of any 
reasonable beneficial use. "It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the designation is 
without a rational basis and, hence, it should be sustained." [d. at 133,316 N.E.2d at 312, 
359 N.Y.S. 2d at 17 (Jasen, J. dissenting). Implicit within Judge Jasen's dissent is his rejec-
tion of the contention that the church could no longer put the property to any reasonable 
beneficial use. 
'" Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See text at note 38, supra. 
125 Note, Urban Landmarks: Preserving Our Cities' Aesthetic and Cultural Resources, 39 
ALB. L. REv. 521, 531 (1975). Several cases support this proposition. [d. at 523 n.16-17. 
12. The Appellate Division in Sailor's Snug Harbor held that the landmark designation 
effects a taking "where maintenance of the landmark either physically or financially prevents 
or seriously interferes with carrying out the charitable purpose." 29 App. Div. 2d at 378; 288 
N.Y.S.2d at 316. 
127 Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 130, 316 N.E.2d 
305, 311, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 15 (1974). 
1211 Note, Urban Landmarks: Preserving Our Cities' Aesthetic and Cultural Resources, 39 
ALB. L. REv. 521, 533 (1975) (emphasis added). 
121 Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 499, 121 N.E.2d 517,519 
(1954) (emphasis added). 
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however, "identified a lower threshold of interference for invalidat-
ing a landmark ordinance than for other land use controls under the 
police power."130 This lower threshold results in a landmark ordi-
nance being invalidated if it requires landowners to use their prop-
erty for the public good, which almost by definition all landmark 
ordinances require, and if the landowner can show that the ordi-
nance precludes his use of the property in anyone specific way. 
Under this standard few landowners would have difficulty estab-
lishing the requisite factors to invalidate a preservation ordinance. 
Under the more frequently used reasonable beneficial use test the 
landowner must show either that the ordinance rationally furthers 
no legitimate state interest or that there is no longer available to 
him any reasonable beneficial use to which the property can be 
put. This test is later used by the United States Supreme Court 
in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York. However, the 
New York Court of Appeals in its Penn Central decision used an 
extraordinarily broad test under which no landowner could invali-
date a landmark ordinance. The New York State Court of Appeals 
has covered the spectrum of validation standards: the Supreme 
Court and most other courts presently apply the reasonable bene-
ficial use test. 
V. PENN CENTRAL TRANSP. Co. V. CITY OF NEW YORK 
A. State Proceedings 
While the status of the landmark preservation ordinance was un-
certain following Lutheran Church, the decisions of the New York 
State courts in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York 131 
compounded the confusion. In addition, the Penn Central decision 
by the Supreme Court in 1978132 did not altogether resolve this con-
fusion. 
The background of the Penn Central case is complex and covers 
a period of eleven years from the landmark designation to the final 
decision. In 1967 the New York City Landmarks Commission desig-
nated Grand Central Terminal a landmark and the Board of Esti-
130 Note, Urban Landmarks: Preserving Our Cities' Aesthetic and Cultural Resources, 39 
ALB. L. REv. 521, 533 (1975). The author of the Note suggests that this result is explained in 
that, where aesthetics constitutes the legislative objective, a lesser degree of intrusion is to 
be tolerated. [d. at 534. See also the trial court decision in Trustees of the Sailor's Snug 
Harbor v. Platt, 53 Misc. 2d 933,937, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75, 78 (Sup. Ct. 1967), rev'd, 29 App. 
Div. 2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968). 
131 42 N.Y.2d 324,366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977). An excellent analysis of this 
decision is found in 57 B.U. L. REv. 931 (1977). 
132 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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mate approved the designation. Following the designation, in 1968 
Penn Central entered into a renewable fifty-year lease and sub-lease 
with UGP Properties, Inc. l33 The terms of the lease provided for 
UGP to construct a multistory office building above the terminal, 
UGP paying Penn Central $1 million annually during construction 
and not less than $3 million annually thereafter. 134 If things had gone 
as planned, Penn Central would have lost between $700,000 and $1 
million in net rentals from displaced concessionaires previously lo-
cated within the terminal. l35 Subsequently, Penn Central and UGP 
applied to the Commission seeking permission to construct atop 
Grand Central Terminal. Penn Central, in its application, pre-
sented two plans, one for a fifty-five story building and one for a 
fifty-three story building, both of which satisfied applicable zoning 
ordinances. The Commission denied a certificate of no exterior ef-
fect and a certificate of appropriateness.13s Penn Central did not 
seek judicial review of the denial of either certificate. Because the 
terminal site enjoyed a tax exemption, remained suitable for its 
present and future uses and was not the subject of a contract of sale, 
no further administrative remedies were available to Penn Central 
as to the two proposed plans.137 Although Penn Central could not 
build above the terminal, it did own at least eight other properties 
which were eligible to receive the transferable development rights 
available to it by the Commission's prohibition of construction.13s 
Following the Commission's denial of the certificates, Penn Cen-
tral and UGP filed suit in the state trial court claiming that the 
landmark law had "taken" their property (Le. development rights 
above the terminal) without just compensation in violation of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion and arbitrarily deprived them of their property without due 
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Penn 
Central sought an injunction enjoining the city from using the land-
mark law to impede the construction of an otherwise lawful struc-
ture above the terminal. The trial court granted injunctive relief. 13B 
135 [d. at 116. UGP Properties, Inc. (UGP) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Union General 
Properties, Ltd., a United Kingdom corporation. 
IU [d. 
IU [d. at 115. 
131 The terminal was originally designed to support a 20 story tower above the base; how-
ever, the tower was never constructed. [d. 
IU See note 92, supra. 
131 438 U.S. 104, 115 (1978). See also text at note 95, supra. 
I .. [d. at 119. 
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The city appealed to the intermediate state appellate court, 
which reversed the trial court.140 The Appellate Division relied on 
traditional guidelines in evaluating whether a taking had occurred, 
holding that since the restrictions promoted a legitimate public pur-
pose, Penn Central could sustain its claim only by showing that the 
regulation deprived it of all reasonable beneficial use of the prop-
erty.141 The Appellate Division found that Penn Central had not 
shown that the unused development rights over the terminal could 
not have been profitably transferred to one or more nearby sites, 
thereby concluding that Penn Central had shown only that they had 
been deprived of the property's most profitable use, and that this 
showing did not establish any constitutional violation. 142 
The New York Court of Appeals, with considerable embellish-
ment, affirmed. 143 In a unanimous opinion, written by Chief Judge 
Breitel, the court held that, 
a property owner is not absolutely entitled to receive a return on so 
much of the property's value as was created by social investment [Le. 
as a result of subsidies and limited rights of eminent domain accorded 
to the railroad to obtain a right of way for its track] and, even as to the 
privately created ingredient of the property's value, a plaintiff seeking 
to show that an otherwise reasonable land use regulation constitutes a 
deprivation of due process of law must demonstrate affirmatively that 
the regulation eliminates all reasonable return. \44 
The emphasis on receiving a reasonable return on only the private 
investment is a major part of the decision, although it was raised 
for substantially the first time in the Court of Appeals. 145 
"" Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 
(1975), afl'd, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1977), aft'd, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978). 
'" [d. at 274, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 29. See text at note 160, infra. 
'" [d. at 274, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 29. 
"3 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), afl'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
". [d. at 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921 (citations omitted) . 
... Without the assistance of the city's transit system, now municipally owned and 
subsidized, the property, with or without a towering office structure atop it, would be of 
considerably decreased value .... Plaintiffs may not now frustrate legitimate and im· 
portant social objectives by complaining, in essence, that government regulation deprives 
them of a return on so much of the investment made not by private interests but by the 
people of the city and State through their government. Instead, to prevail, plaintiffs must 
establish that there was no possibility of earning a reasonable return on the privately 
contributed ingredient of the property's value. 
42 N.Y.2d 324, 332-33,366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276,397 N.Y.S.2d 914,919 (1977). 
Chief Judge Breitel recognized that "the massive and indistinguishable public, governmen· 
tal, and private contributions to a landmark like the Grand Central Terminal are inseparably 
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Another innovative and significant aspect of the decision was 
Chief Judge Breitel's holding that when government overregulates, 
the regulated landowner is required to be compensated to the value 
of the reasonable beneficial use of the property, rather than the 
highest and best use standard applied in eminent domain's just 
compensation. 14e It must be noted, though, that since the court did 
not find overregulation much of its theory is dicta, however persua-
sive and attractive it might otherwise be. Prior to this decision, 
when government regulation caused the land value to fall below the 
reasonable beneficial use value, the landowner was awarded the 
value of the property for its highest and best use. 147 After finding no 
taking, the court stated: 
[l]and use regulation often diminishes the value of the property to the 
landowner. Constitutional standards, however, are offended only when 
that diminution leaves the owner with no reasonable use of the property. 
The situation with transferable development rights is analogous. If the 
substitute rights received provide reasonable compensation for a land-
owner forced to relinquish development rights on a landmark site, there 
has been no deprivation of due process. The compensation need not 
be the 'just' compensation required in eminent domain, for there has 
been no attempt to take the property. . . . 
These substitute rights are valuable, and provide significant, perhaps 
'fair,' compensation for the loss of rights above the terminal itself. 14M 
joint ... ," yet he concluded that "[ilt is exceedingly difficult but imperative, neverthe-
less to sort out the merged ingredients and to assess the rights and responsibilities of owner 
and society." Id. at 333,366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 919. Costonis equates this with 
"christening a search for the Holy Grail." Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the 
Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 HARv. L. REv. 402,417 (1977). It will be fascinating to 
see what becomes of this financial and jurisprudential wizardry in the years to come. 
,,, Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 335, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 
1278,397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 921 (1977). 
'17 To illustrate the possible savings which would be realized by a municipality under the 
Court of Appeals holding, let us examine a hypothetical landmark with a highest and best 
use valuation of $1,000,000, a reasonable beneficial use value of $100,000, and a current 
market value of $500,000. Before this decision if government by police power regulation 
caused the property value to fall to $100,000 the owner would absorb a $400,000 loss; if the 
property value were depressed to $90,000 the owner could claim inverse condemnation and 
exchange the property for $1,000,000 (realizing a $500,000 profit). The New York Court of 
Appeals holding in Penn Central indicates that if government by overregulation depressed 
the value to $90,000 the municipality would have to award only the $10,000 necessary to 
return the property to its reasonable beneficial use valuation, the title to the landmark 
remaining in the owner. 
, .. 42 N.Y.2d at 335·36,366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22 (emphasis added). This 
indicates that transferable development rights will become more universally utilized since 
(under this standard) TOR's will always offset and usually eliminate any need for compen-
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This decisional standard, basically the reasonable beneficial use 
test, is clearly more favorable to those who seek to uphold the ordi-
nance. These two elements, the elimination from consideration of 
land value created by societal efforts and the entitlement of the 
landowner to compensation based only on a reasonable beneficial 
use value, are likely to have substantial and extensive impact upon 
land use regulation since they redefine the "taking" limitations of 
police power (permissible non-compensatory regulation) by redefin-
ing both land value and compensation.14' 
B. United States Supreme Court Decision 
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the Penn Central 
case along more traditional guidelines. 1M Justice Brennan, speaking 
for the majority, identified the following issues: 
(1) [w]hether the restrictions imposed by New York City's law upon 
appellants' exploitation of the Terminal site effect a 'taking' of appel-
lants property for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment . . . and, (2) if so, whether the transferable development rights 
afforded appellants constitute 'just compensation' within the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment. ISI 
The Court found it unnecessary to reach the second question. 
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, framed the major issue as: 
[w]hether the cost associated with the city of New York's desire to 
preserve a limited number of 'landmarks' within its borders must be 
borne by all of its taxpayers or whether it can instead be imposed en-
tirely on the owners of the individual properties. II! 
The minority's formulation of the issue was based on allowing a 
landowner wide latitude in the use of his "private" property -
sation to the landowner by the municipality if indeed any compensation is required. The 
opinion does not, however, discuss whether other land use regulations (for example, regula-
tions designed to stimulate industrial and commercial development) will have to compensate 
to the standard of reasonable beneficial use or highest and best use. Interestingly, under a 
strict application of the reasonable benefit use test no compensation is required since the 
owner is left with at least one reasonable beneficial use. 
'" For a comprehensive discussion of Chief Judge Breitel's innovative analysis, see Profes-
sor Costonis' insightful The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Decision, 91 
HARV. L. REv. 402 (1977). See also text at notes 69, 70, supra. 
, .. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The majority's 
analysis utilized the traditional principles of Mugler and Penn. Coal. See text at notes 34, 
50, supra. 
15' 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978). 
15. Id. at 139 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). 
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latitude previously delimited in the nineteenth century by Justice 
Harlan's concern in Mugler u. Kansas l53 with the ability of govern-
ment to excercise police power to promote the general welfare. 
In a 5-3 decision the Criurtl54 held that "[t]he restrictions im-
posed are substantially related to the promotion of the general wel-
fare and. . . permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site 
. . . ,"155 Therefore constitutional objections to the police power 
regulations were eliminated. The opinion neither accepts nor reject~ 
Judge Breitel's ideas concerning the owner's entitlement, or lack 
thereof, to compensation for value contributed by societal efforts.15H 
Neither does the Court address the appropriateness of the reasona-
ble beneficial use standard for determining the value to which the 
owner must be compensated. 
The Court did, however, further identify the elements necessary 
to effect a taking and analyzed the taking doctrine in terms of the 
traditional "bundle of rights" concept:157 
'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete seg-
ments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment 
have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular govern-
mental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on 
the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interfer-
ence with rights in the parcel as a whole, here, the city tax block desig-
nated as the 'landmark site."58 
By examining both "the character of the action and. . . the nature 
and extent of the interference" the Court forthrightly stated that 
both the kind of regulation and degree of intrusion are relevant. 
Indeed there is a point at which kind and degree become so interre-
'113 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See text at note 34, supra. 
'14 Justices Burger, Rehnquist and Stevens dissented in an opinion written by Justice 
Rehnquist. 
, .. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978). 
'M Although the Court did determine that "[t]aking jurisprudence does not divide a single 
parcel into discrete segments . . . [but] focuses rather both on the character of the action 
and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole. . . . ," 
this statement is too general to be considered a diplomatic rejection of the "social increment" 
theory. The "discrete segment" the Court examines is not the social contributi9n to the 
terminal's value but rather the development rights above the terminal which Penn Central 
no longer had and for which it sought compensation. The Court only refers to the "social 
increment" theory in a footnote, stating "since the judgment of the Court of Appeals in any 
event rests upon bases that support our affirmance. . . we have no occasion to address the 
question." [d. at 121 n.23. The "social increment" theory should still be considered good law 
in New York. 
,.7 See text at notes 14-15, supra. 
, .. 438 U.S. 104, i30-31 (1978). 
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lated that they can no longer differentiate valid from invalid regula-
tion. It is suggested that this point is where the regulation precludes 
any reasonable beneficial use or, as Justice Holmes phrased it, 
where the diminution of property value reaches a "certain magni-
tude" and the state is forced to acquire the property by eminent 
domain. 159 All of these ideas are expressed in the reasonable benefi-
cial use standard, which has as its foundation the idea that an 
individual should not be forced to subsidize the state by maintain-
ing property which lacks all value to him as a result of government 
regulation. Penn Central holds that the reasonable beneficial use 
test is the appropriate decisional standard to evaluate historic pres-
ervation legislation. 
One problem with the Court's analysis, however, is that it puts a 
premium on the definition of what the "parcel as a whole" is. This 
is especially significant in a time of sophisticated commercial land 
transactions when parties often seek to obtain less than a fee inter-
est and both sales and extended lease arrangements of "discrete 
segments" (Le. development rights) become more familiar. Penn 
Central stated that "[t]hey accept for present purposes ... that 
the parcel of land occupied by Grand Central Terminal must, in its 
present state, be regarded as capable of earning a reasonable return 
. . . ."180 Once the reasonable beneficial use standard was found to 
have been satisfied, the only way Penn Central could have prevailed 
was to have shown that the landmark preservation law did not 
further any governmental interest, that is to say, that the nature of 
the regulation itself invalidated the regulation. The Court, however, 
explicitly rejected this contention. 161 
In contrast, Justice Rehnquist disagreed that a reasonable benefi-
cial use standard was appropriate, and instead focused on the 
"im position of general costs on a few individuals," and the character 
of the invasion. "A taking does not become a noncompensable exer-
cise of police power simply because the government in its grace 
allows the owner to make some 'reasonable' use of his property."182 
It would seem that, attractive though this argument is to those 
concerned with increased governmental regulation of private affairs, 
the argument will most likely be regarded as a relic of less industri-
alized, less urbanized, less regulated and perhaps more tranquil 
times. 
". See text at note 65, supra. 
II. 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978) (citations omitted). 
'" [d. at 134. 
18' [d. at 149 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). 
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Applying the concepts of the majority, however, it is not immedi-
ately apparent that the long term lessee of Penn Central's develop-
ment rights retained a reasonable beneficial use since the develop-
ment rights above the terminal no longer existed as they were per-
ceived by the parties at the time the lease was signed. To extend 
the issue still further, suppose UGP had purchased (rather than 
leased) the development rights from Penn Central for the purpose 
of constructing a fifty-story office building, initially financing its 
construction with a mortgage obtained using the development rights 
as the mortgage security-not an unlikely occurrence. 183 The relative 
rights and priorities of the parties are uncertain when the security 
evaporates due to a police power regulation. In addition to these 
uncertainties, questions arise as to whether any compensation is 
necessary and, if so, the value to which the parties must be compen-
sated. If the development rights are transferable, once the develop-
ment of the original site is prohibited due to a landmark ordinance, 
it is unclear whether the development rights are a "single parcel" 
(as the developer would see them) or a "discrete segment" (as the 
owner of the freehold would see them). If the development rights are 
a "discrete segment" of a larger parcel, it could be expected that the 
existence of marketable development rights alone would provide a 
reasonable beneficial use for the larger parcel. If the development 
rights are in themselves a single parcel, then the reasonable benefi-
cial use standard would be applied to the original site without exam-
ining the marketability of the development rights. It must be re-
emphasized that the characterization ofthe affected property would 
likely be the pivotal point. In many ways Penn Central was an easy 
case. 
C. Policy Implications of Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New 
York 
The effects of Penn Central will most likely be far-reaching, as 
municipal, county, state and federal regulatory bodies begin to en-
force their regulations within the expanded perimeter of the New 
York Court of Appeals and United States Supreme Court Penn 
Central decisions. If the case is expansively construed the progres-
sive growth of government involvement in private land use will con-
tinue at a quickened pace. l84 There are, however, several critical 
"' See note 16, supra. 
'" See Freilich, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: New Trends and Developments in Environ-
mental and Land-Use Controls, 1974 mST. OF PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 1; 
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factors which underlie the case and may substantially confine the 
application of Penn Central to several narrow classes of property or 
landowners. 
Initially, it must be recognized that Penn Central was in a partic-
ularly weak position to object to Judge Breitel's elimination of the 
"social increment" in determining reasonable return. IRS Grand Cen-
tral Terminal's value came from massive public investment and 
Penn Central's virtual monopoly over track space which was itself 
acquired by an exercise of the state's eminent domain power on 
behalf of Penn Central's predecessor. Secondarily, the requirement 
that compensation be "fair" and not the "highest and best use" 
value may be applicable to only a restricted category of regulated 
property such as landmarks. As more cases are decided, the applica-
ble categories to which this new compensationl88 applies will be 
defined in greater detail. 
If Penn Central is not narrowly construed several new develop-
ments might be expected. With New York City's Landmark Pres-
ervation Law to serve as a constitutionally permissible model, rapid 
growth of local landmark preservation is likely. This is especially 
true since under the Court of Appeals decision, which was not re-
jected by the Supreme Court, government need only compensate 
the owner to the reasonable beneficial use valuation and may disre-
gard any social increment in determining value. 
While the Supreme Court in reaching its decision precisely identi-
fied private investment in historic preservation as a desirable foun-
dation of a preservation program, its decision discourages private 
investment efforts by tacitly approving the lower court's widening 
of the state's non-compensatory regulating ability. Of course the 
Siegan, Controlling Other People's Property Through Covenants, Zoning, State and Federal 
Regulation, 5 ENVT'L L. 385 (1975). 
II. The social increment theory and its underpinnings occupy many paragraphs of the 
opinion and will undoubtedly mesmerize the commentators. If there ever was a case 
warranting the theory's application, Grand Central Terminal is the case. The rough justice 
of discounting the Terminal's rate of return on the basis of New York City's active contri-
butions to the profitability of the Terminal and of Penn Central's nearby holdings is 
intuitively appealing. . . . [However] there are two factors cutting against the theory's 
general applicability. First, it applies only to a small number of properties-like the 
Terminal-whose commercial utility is largely a consequence of massive public invest-
ments at or near the site and whose owners are the beneficiaries of dramatic infusions of 
public largesse . . . . Second, the segregation and quantification of an individual prop-
erty's public and private increments of value are truly formidable tasks . . . . 
Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 HARv. 
L. REv. 402, 416 (1977). 
II. See note 147, supra. 
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New York State Court of Appeals has no power to establish binding 
precedent outside of New York State. However, the financial at-
tractiveness to municipalities of the decision will likely provoke 
similar reasoning and results by other states' courts. Additionally, 
the Court of Appeals decision unnecessarily redefined the compen-
sation necessary when a taking does occur, also restricting compen-
sation to only that lost value which had been created by "private 
efforts." The dissimilarity between these contemporaneous deci-
sions on identical facts by the two most influential courts does not 
insure growth in a market which relies on stability and predictabil-
ity of long-term profit to encourage substantial private investment. 
Concurrent with a possible proliferation of legislation similar to 
the New York ordinance, it might be expected that susceptible his-
toric urban structures will decline in marketability (especially com-
mercial structures) as institutional lenders withdraw mortgage 
money. In an unhealthy market such as this, a marginally profitable 
structure may suffer serious economic injury with its designation as 
a landmark. 187 
This problem of uncertainty concerning the financial stability of 
historic structures may be offset by legislative efforts drafted in 
response to Penn Central. The new legislation should provide a 
comprehensive and equitable system of historic preservation which 
allows both owner and community maximum flexibility within 
clearly established guidelines and which is no longer constrained by 
outmoded doctrines. New legislation should also assure all who are 
involved in the commercial real estate market-especially institu-
tionallenders-of the predictability and profitability of the market 
in historic urban structures. Such a statute might provide that the 
state guarantee the mortgage of any designated historic structure by 
purchasing the mortgage from the mortgagee for the remaining in-
debtedness if the mortgagor should default. This would eliminate 
the high-risk nature of mortgages on historic structures, making 
mortgage money available at lower interest rates and thereby en-
couraging private preservation. A mortgage guarantee program 
would literally stabilize the financial aspects of historic preservation 
overnight. Additionally, such a program might awaken the state to 
the commercial risks inherent in historic preservation-a risk of 
which institutional lenders are acutely aware. Properly done, the 
costs of such a guarantee program would be far less than the eco-
nomic benefits inherent in a predictable, stable and efficient preser-
117 See note 16, supra. 
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vation program.'RH In constructing new doctrines, the various stan-
dards currently applied by courts should be examined for the land 
use patterns which evolve in response to each standard. A uniform 
local standard can then be devised which reflects the community's 
priorities in this field and gives the preservation program predicta-
biliity and stability. 
Of more distant concern, but of potentially greater. aesthetic and 
architectural impact, historic preservation cases such as Penn 
Central may force a developer to fully utilize all property rights 
available to him at the time of constructing a distinctive structure. 
A structure need only be thirty years old to be designated a land-
mark. IRD It is not unrealistic to assume that some buildings currently 
under construction may be designated landmarks even before the 
original mortgage is repaid. 
Whichever standard, the one preferred by the New York Court of 
Appeals or the one advocated by the United States Supreme Court, 
is applied to compensation of affected landowners, it still must be 
decided who will quantify the appropriate standard. Either the judi-
ciary or the legislature must determine what is the minimum ac-
ceptable "reasonable return" on an investment before a reasonable 
beneficial use becomes impossible. In New York City legislation has 
set the reasonable return on landmark property at a minimum of 6 
percent. 170 A legislature's involvement in this decision-making pro-
cess is preferable to a judicial determination of the quantifiable 
standardYI Neither the forces of rampant commercial development 
II. See NAT'L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PRESERVING OLD 
BUILDINGS (1976); Note, Urban Redevelopment and the Fiscal Crisis of the Central City, 21 
ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 820 (1978). See also note 16, supra . 
.. I See note 83, supra. 
"0 New York City Administrative Code, Ch. 8-A § 207-1.0(v)(1) (1970). 
171 Although reasonable beneficial use functions as a standard in the judiciary's hands, 
it must be translated into more concrete form-through quantification or otherwise-by 
legislatures that implement compensatory programs. . . . Realistically perceived, the six 
percent rate is nothing more or less than the outcome of the familiar legislative process of 
compromise of competing interests, in which the ethical values of the public decision-
maker play a dominant role . . . . [Ljegislatures, not the courts, [shouldj take the 
leading role in resolving the disparity issue because, whatever their failings, legislatures 
are better equipped than the courts both to seek consensus on this complex and contro-
versial issue and to prescribe rules implementing the reasonable use standard for particu-
lar categories of regulated properties. The judiciary's task, under the constitutionally 
mandated standard, is to decide whether the rules that legislatures fix fall within this 
standard's ambit. 
Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 HARV. 
L. REv. 402, 424-25 (1977). Support for the position that this decision is properly a function 
of the judiciary is found in Berger, The Accomodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A 
Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 799 (1976). 
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nor the preservationists are so legislatively underrepresented or pol-
itically isolated as to require judicial protection. 172 The kind of 
policy-making considerations involved in determining the mini-
mum acceptable reasonable return clearly constitutes a political 
decision, over which legislatures have traditionally been accorded 
wide latitude. 173 Additionally, a legislature, having jurisdiction over 
zoning and taxation programs, is uniquely able to develop a compre-
hensive, stable preservation program. Such a program is imperative 
in order to attract capital toa secure and financially predictable 
investment, thereby encouraging private preservation efforts.174 
One problem with historic preservation legislation was not com-
prehensively addressed by any court during the Penn Central con-
troversy. Historic preservation efforts may sometimes run afoul of 
the constitutional requirement of equal protection, which mandates 
that all structures similarly situated be similarly treated. Almost 
by definition such a requirement puts a premium on location in con-
sidering the acceptability of the regulation. Regulation of historic 
structures, unlike historic districts, may be susceptible to abuse 
because there is no guarantee that all similar structures will be 
treated alike, since they are not all located in one compact, easily 
regulated area. This abuse is commonly known as "spot zoning."175 
There has been, however, no showing that courts are less able to 
identify and remedy discrimination in the regulation of land use 
than they are in other analogous fields. With the increased impact 
of urban land use decisions on the community, perhaps the new 
trend of zoning for the individual landmark might better be concep-
tualized as regulation according to class of land usage rather than 
the present policy which considers primarily geographic location. 
This zoning for the single landmark will undoubtedly withstand the 
usual equal protection challenge to such individualized legisla-
tion. 178 The focal point in such an equal protection challenge would 
probably be the number of parcels affected and the consistency with 
a prescribed program, rather than the contiguity of the affected 
172 See Ragsdale & Sher, The Court's Role in the Evolution of Power Over Land, 7 URB. 
LAw. 60 (1975). 
173 See Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 
91 HARV. L. REv. 402, 424-25 (1977). But see Berger, The Accomodation Power in Land Use 
Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 820-21 (1976). 
'" See text at notes 72-74, supra. 
'75 See note 111, supra. 
178 See 2 RATHKOPF, THE LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING, Ch. 26 (4th ed. 1978). See also note 
Ill, supra; Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 132 n.28 (1978). 
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parcels. Both the number of parcels affected and the regulation's 
consistency with a prescribed program will insure similar treatment 
for similar structures. The emphasis given to location as the primary 
and often sole determinant of the property's approved use should be 
eliminated as other traditional but antiquated property doctrines 
are being relinquished. The British, who developed many of the 
property principles now utilized in the United States, have since 
discarded location as the most significant feature of land use plan-
ning and now classify structures, for purposes of historic preserva-
tion, according to the structure's cultural significance. 177 By examin-
ing innovative foreign preservation policies in addition to develop-
ments under the various federal, state and local standards now uti-
lized, a municipality will be able to devise a preservation program 
uniquely suited to its own needs. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Examination of case law developments in the area of police power 
regulation of land use shows the absence of a uniform, consistently 
applied decisional standard. The primary method of evaluating the 
validity of a police power regulation in the late nineteenth century 
was to determine the nature of the regulation: if it regulated aspects 
of land ownership considered to be the proper concern of govern-
ment it was a valid regulation, regardless of how extensive its im-
pact might be on the owner. This refusal to recognize the degree of 
interference as important was rejected by Justice Holmes, who 
stated that there was a certain point beyond which regulation 
amounted to a taking and as such required compensation. These 
two considerations, the nature of the regulation and the extent of 
its impact, were used inconsistently by the New York State courts 
to reach widely different results in their struggle to define a deci-
177 Wilson & Winkler, The Response of State Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 LAW 
AND CONTEMP. PROB. 329, 333 (1971). Other foreign approaches to the development of historic 
preservation programs may be found in Chouinard, La legislation en Matiere de biens cultu-
rels en droit franc;ais et en droit qu~becois, 16 CAHIER DE DROIT 431 (1975); Johnstone, 
Government Control of Urban Land Development in Australia: A Model for Comparison, 51 
TUL. L. REV. 547 (1977); Bartke & Shinn, Land Use Planning in Iran-A Critical Survey, 20 
WAYNE L. REV. 87 (1973); Raub, English and French Regulation of Historic Amenities, 2 
EARTH L.J. 291 (1976); Goy, The International Protection of the Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, 4 NETH. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 117 (1973); Gae, Land Law in India: With Special Refer-
ence to the Constitution, 22 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 312 (1973); Green, Planning in Great Britain 
-A Series. Part VI: Preservation of Historic Buildings, 31 POPULAR Gov'T 19 (1965); ADVISORY 
COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH 
CONG., 2D SESS., THE NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION PROGRAMS TODAY (Comm. Print 1976). 
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sional standard to be used to evaluate historic preservation legisla-
tion. This process culminated in the Penn Central litigation, where 
the state's highest court held that New York City's historic preser-
vation ordinance was invalid only if it removed all reasonable bene-
ficial use from the property. The New York Court of Appeals further 
held that in determining a reasonable return on his investment an 
owner was not entitled to a return on any investment in his property 
that resulted from societal efforts. The Supreme Court reviewed the 
case in a more conservative manner, including in its decisional stan-
dard a consideration of both the nature of the regulation and the 
extent of its impact on the landowner. The final standard that has 
evolved incorporates features of all the tests of validity that pre-
ceded it: a police power regulation of historic property is valid if it 
allows the owner a reasonable beneficial use of his property and 
furthers a permissible government interest. While this standard 
clarifies the general principles involved, it leaves unanswered many 
questions concerning historic preservation law and policy. 
Much historic preservation legislation and litigation has created 
confusion as courts and legislatures struggle to mold outmoded legal 
doctrines to fit new needs of the contemporary community, needs 
which are substantially different from .those which the legal doc-
trines were initially designed to meet. This confusion stems basi-
cally from the community's uncertainty and ambivalence toward 
landed property's entitlements. Confusion originates also in the 
modern struggle to objectify the priorities to be given parties in the 
conflict of collective rights versus private rights, where both collec-
tive and private rights exist simultaneously in the same piece of 
property. The primary dilemma which the community must con-
front in the conflict of private rights versus collective rights is the 
extent to which private rights can be extracted from an unwilling 
private party, without compensation, for the collective good. In the 
context of historic preservation and other land use programs the 
question is phrased in terms of the constitutional ambit of police 
power regulation and the identification of when collective acquisi-
tion becomes a "taking." 
While the community struggles to resolve the conflict between 
private and collective rights with new legislation such as New York 
City's Landmark Preservation Law, it cannot escape the problems 
typically attendant to innovative legislation. New ideas introduced 
in the legislation, among them the potentially far-reaching concept 
of transferable development rights, have yet to be finely tuned. New 
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problems, such as the removal of necessary stability from the com-
mercial mortgage market, have accompanied the state's intrusion 
into previously untouched areas. The Penn Central litigation, along 
with earlier litigation, has mounted a challenge based upon tradi-
tional eminent domain and police power principles. This challenge 
has been unsuccessful, although it has precisely delineated areas of 
concern to which policymakers must respond in designing a long-
lasting, successful preservation program. Penn Central has shown 
that historic preservation legislation is characteristic of new legisla-
tion: the underlying legislative policy is sound while the means 
utilized to execute that policy should be revised in light of new 
experience to more closely implement the desired objectives. 
